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ABSTRACT
NASA, at the request of the AEC, is conduct-
ing a preliminary study to determine the
feasibility of disposing of nuclear waste
material into space. The study has indicated
that the Space Shuttle together with expend-
able and non-expendable orbital stages such
as the Space Tug or Centaur can safety dis-
pose of waste material by ejecting it from
the solar system. (No launching system that
is under development or planned can deposit
waste material directly into the Sun.) The
safety problems associated with all phases
of launching and operation (normal, emer-
gency and accident) of such a system are
being examined. From the preliminary study
it appears that solutions can be found that
should make the risks acceptable when com-
pared to the benefits to be obtained from the
disposal of the nuclear waste. The tech-
niques proposed to make such a system accept-
able need to be carefully verified by further
study and experiment. Even though more than
one hundred shuttle launches would be required
per year by the year 2000, the cost to the
consumer would be less than five percent of
his electric bill. Tests of models of waste
packages impacted on reinforced concrete and
soil have demonstrated the feasibility of
safely containing waste material at impact
speeds up to 1050 feet per second.
INTRODUCTION
In order to meet the demand for electrical
energy, the U.S. will be counting heavily
on nuclear powerplants. The Atomic Energy
Commission projects that by 1990 the U.S.
will need the equivalent of almost 4-00
nuclear powerplants of 1000 MWe capacity
each (see fig. 1 and ref. 1). Extrapolating
to the year 2000 doubles the number.
A key issue is how to dispose of the large
quantity of radioactive waste materials that
will be produced. The group of radioactive
wastes most difficult to handle is the
actinides. These are the isotopes generated
by transmutation of isotopes of the heavy
elements (atomic weights in the range of 227
and higher). Compared to most of the fission
products, they have exceedingly long half-
lives and human beings are very sensitive to
them.
If they are ingested into the human body, they
tend to stay there and continually irradiate
the person from within. In addition, because
the actinides generally have half-lives of tens
of thousands of years, they must be stored
for hundreds of thousands of years before they
decay to levels safe enough that release to
the biosphere can be tolerated.
The amount of actinides generated each year by
a typical 1000 MWe nuclear powerplant is 30
kilograms (see fig. 2). If they are stored
for ten years, the residue is about 72,000
curies* of radioactivity (ref. 1) . A human
being in a lifetime can safely tolerate amounts
like 0.01 to 30 microcuries (millionths of a
curie) (ref. 2). This means that one 1000 MWe
reactor produces somewhere between a billion
and a trillion allowable life-time ingestion
doses each year.
The reason for the extraordinary safety
practices that has become a trademark of the
nuclear power industry is apparent. The un-
paralleled safety record of nuclear industry
gives testimony to the dramatic success of the
safety practices that have been enforced.
An additional characteristic of radioactive
materials is that they generate heat while
they decay. One year's worth of actinides
from a 1000 MWe powerplant produces about 2 kW
of heat. This is a factor that must also be
considered in the design of systems for han-
dling of radioactive waste materials.
As stated earlier, there will be hundreds of
nuclear powerplants of the equivalent of 1000
MWe each in operation after 1980. The total
number of allowable life-time ingestion doses
of actinides produced each year from all of
these plants is of the order of thousands to
*0ne curie is about the rate of radioactive
disintegration of 1 gram of radium.
millions of billions (see fig. 3). Because of
the long decay times, the doses generated even
over centuries accumulate. By 1990 doses like
a million billion times that which is allow-
able per person will have been generated (fig.
3). The allowable release rates to the
environment must therefore be extremely small.
WASTE DISPOSAL STUDY
The AEC is currently making intensive studies
of how the radioactive waste materials can
best be disposed of or stored with virtually
no leakage. Figure M- lists a variety of
techniques that is receiving attention. Ex-
cept for transmutation for which a practical
process needs to be invented, space disposal
is the only technique that offers the unique
potential of entirely getting rid of the
material from Earth. In this case only short-
term storage would be necessary on Earth.
The Atomic Energy Commission has asked NASA
to study the feasibility of disposing of
radioactive waste into space. A team led by
Lewis Research Center was formed of experts
from Ames, Johnson, and Kennedy Space Centers
and also from NASA's Nuclear Safety Office
and AEC's Battelle Northwest Laboratory.
Various launch vehicles including Atlas-
Centaur, Saturn V, and Titan IIIE-Centaur,
and the Space Shuttle were considered. In
orbit, launch stages considered included
expendable stages like Centaur and recover-
able stages like the proposed Space Tug.
The destinations for the waste material pay-
loads considered (ref. 3) were Earth orbit,
solar orbit, solar system escape and solar
impact. Earth orbits between synchronous
orbit and the Moon's orbit were considered
as storage locations from which the waste
packages would eventually be retrieved and
permanently disposed of by later generations.
Solar orbits achieved by Earth escape (single
burn to elliptical orbit) and also by Earth
escape followed by an insertion, six months
later, into a 0.9 AU orbit were studied.
Analysis has not assured that packages in the
elliptical orbits would never intercept Earth
for the 300,000 year period needed for radio-
active decay to safe levels.
So2a r-system escape accomplished first by
boost via the Shuttle into low-altitude Earth
orbit and then by a two-stage acceleration to
solar-system-escape velocity was found to be
the most attractive technique because this
offered the possibility of permanently getting
rid of the waste material.
Solar impact (burial in the Sun), because of
the high energy required, was not possible
with any combination of the launch vehicles
now available or planned. This technique
would require a major advance in space propul-
sion capability, such as electric or laser
propulsion.
Consideration was also given, in the case of
solar-system escape and solar impact, to the
use of planet swing-by trajectories. Because
of the requirements for sophisticated guidance
and control systems that must be operable many
months after launch with both extreme accuracy
and reliability and because of the launch-
window requirements, swing-by trajectories are
not favored.
The disposing of radioactive waste materials
into space poses the problems of safety and
reliability of the launching systems. Figure
5 lists some of these. There are safety prob-
lems concerned with normal, emergency, and
accident situations that can occur on the
launch pad, during launch, in orbit, and
during orbital operations and launching to a
final destination.
On the launch pad consideration has been given
to launch pad accidents. These accidents could
result in high over-pressure, high temperatures,
and possible impact of explosion-generated
fragments with the waste package. A package
design evolved, after preliminary screening
studies (ref. 4- and 5) , that would survive all
such postulated accidents.
During Earth and space launch operations, an
abort or accident or emergency situation could
result in the reentry of the package. The pack-
age was designed to be able to withstand a
vertical reentry and a grazing reentry from
Earth escape velocity. The package was designed
so it would not burn up on reentry but would
decelerate so that its impact velocity would be
no more than about 1000 feet per second. Pro-
visions were made in the design so that an im-
pact at these velocities, on surfaces as hard
as reinforced concrete, would not rupture the
package (ref. 6).
The package has shielding built within it to
reduce radiation outside it to safe allowable
levels.
Disposal of the heat that is generated by the
radioactive decay of the waste isotopes is pro-
vided for during all phases of the operation in
normal, emergency and accident situations.
The cost of disposing of the radioactive waste
safely was estimated as a major measure of
feasibility. Public acceptance which involves
trading of risks versus benefits for storing
or disposing of fission products on Earth vs.
disposing in space is difficult to determine
and is recognized as a major problem but not
addressed in this study. The benefits of using
nuclear-generated power must be weighed against
the risk of storing vast quantities of deadly
radioactive waste on Earth for hundreds of
thousands of years, or the risks involved in
major space launch operations required to
eliminate the risks involved in storage on
Earth.
DESCRIPTION OF WASTE PACKAGE
A waste package conceptually designed to safely
handle all the requirements discussed previously
is shown in figure 6. The actinides are em-
bedded in a matrix material. A close-up of the
actinide waste and matrix material is shown in
figure 7. The matrix material is an aluminum-
copper matrix that provides good thermal con-
ductivity to assist in the removal of the heat
generated by the actinides without excessive
internal temperature. The matrix contains
lithium hydride particles. This combination
of aluminum-copper matrix material with lithium
hydride provides high-heat capacity and shield-
ing against the neutrons and gamma radiation
emitted by the waste. The high-heat capacity
minimizes the temperature excursions that can
occur during periods of poor external cooling
or high external temperatures such as would
occur during fires or reentry. The actinide
material in the form of oxides is formed into
glassy beads about one-eighth inch in diameter.
A tungsten shell surrounds the beads with 15
percent void enclosed with the oxides to allow
room for the helium gas generated during the
decay. A moly disulfide coating inhibits
oxidation of the tungsten.
Figure 6 shows two layers of radiation shielding.
An inner metal layer provides a shield pri-
marily for gamma radiation. The outer layer
is composed of lithium hydride to provide
neutron shielding. The shields are surrounded
by an impact shell. This is a ductile shell
of a material like stainless steel that will
not rupture during the rapid and large deforma-
tion of the package that can occur during impact
on hard objects at high speeds. This shell
would probably be multi-layered to provide the
best protection against rupture.
The reentry shield is composed of two layers.
The outer layer is a three-dimensional weaving
of silicon dioxide fibers embedded in a fused
silicon-dioxide matrix. This material is
designed to withstand the extremely high
temperatures that occur during a 90° (perpen-
dicular) reentry into the Earth's atmosphere .
from Earth escape velocity. It provides the
necessary ablative protection and insulation
to survive such a reentry. This outer silicon
dioxide layer is backed up by a graphite reentry
shell that is designed to withstand a long-
duration grazing type of reentry from Earth
escape velocity. The high-heat capacity and
high operating temperature of graphite are
essential for this kind of reentry which will
cause the silicon dioxide layer to completely
ablate away before the reentry is complete.
The center of gravity of the package is well
forward of the center of pressure. The void
between the waste-package impact shell and the
backside of the outer container is filled with
a light-weight, high-conductivity material like
aluminum honeycomb.
Cooling for the waste package in space is pro-
vided by radiation from the outer surface of
the package. During launch into orbit, while
the package is still within the payload bay,
cooling is provided by thermal inertia of the
package and by radiation to the walls of the
payload bay.
The weight breakdown of a package suitable for
launch by the Space Shuttle and Tug combination
to solar-system escape is shown in figure 8.
The total package weighs 3250 kilograms for a
waste material weight material of 200 kilograms.
SUMMARY OF IAUNCH DESTINATIONS RESULTS
The most feasible launch system was found to be
the Space Shuttle (see fig. 9) operated with
various tug configurations (ref. 3). The trans-
portation costs using the Shuttle were found to
be about one-half that for any of the other
launch systems reviewed. A picture of the
Orbiter deploying a Space Tug with a waste pay-
load is shown in figure 10.
In order to launch the waste payload to solar-
system escape velocity, two Space Shuttle
launches are required, one to launch a recover-
able Space Tug and the other to launch an
expendable Tug stage with the payload. The
recoverable Tug is mated with the expendable
Tug in orbit so that the recoverable Tug acts
as a first stage boost from orbit. The Tug
returns to the Orbiter for return to Earth.
The expendable Tug accelerates the payload to
the final velocity required to achieve solar-
system escape.
Figure 11 summarizes a comparison of some of the
payload destinations that were considered.
High Earth orbit requires a container whose
integrity must be assured for long periods of
times (decades or centuries) because they must
be retrieved and disposed of by later genera-
tions. The decomposition of materials like
hydrides could cause hydrogen embrittlement
and weakening of metals by the hydrogen liber-
ated; the internal pressure would build up due
to generation of helium from the decay of the
radioisotopes; and neutrons from spontaneous
fission could potentially embrittle package
materials; all these factors would be expected
to limit the package lifetime when such very
long storage times are considered. Most of
the comments indicated are obvious. "Passive
spacecraft" in the table refers to the fact
that no subsequent burn of a propulsion system
is required at some later date to assure that
the destination is achieved.
The number of Space Shuttle launches required
per year to get rid of the actinide group of
radioactive waste is shown in figure 12 for
high-Earth orbit and for solar-system-escape
destinations. Launches are made ten years
after the waste material has been generated.
By the year 2000 about 100 launches of the
Space Shuttle would be required each year for
the solar system escape disposal.
COST SUMMARY
The cost of-transporting the actinides group
of nuclear powerplant waste material to high
Earth or solar orbit or to solar system escape
is shown in figure 13. The payload weights
shown are the complete waste disposal package
weight. The cost per kilogram shown is the
cost per kilogram of total package weight. The
cost to the consumer is shown in terms of mills
per kW-hr and as a percent of the conumer's
electric bill, the reference cost of electric
to the consumer assumed to be 25 mills per kW-
hr. The cost of transportation for permanently
getting rid of the actinides by launching it
out of the solar system is 2.5 percent of the
consumer's electric bill. The additional cost
of the process required to separate the acti-
nides from the waste products so that only 0.1
or 0.01 percent of the fission products remain
in the waste for space disposal is of the same
order as the transportation cost. The total
cost of permanently getting rid of the worst
radioactive waste material is therefore only
about 5 percent of the consumer's electric bill.
IMPACT EXPERIMENTS
Experiments have been conducted to demonstrate
techniques for designing packages containing
radioactive material that will not rupture
at impact speeds up to 1100 feet per second.
Figure 14- shows a two-stage rocket-sled test
of a two-foot-diameter model that weighs about
500 kilograms. The first stage on the left is
recovered by water-brake deceleration follow-
ing separation from the second stage, which
accelerates the model to its final, desired
impact speed.
The second stage is destroyed by a barrier
while releasing the model for impact onto a
five-foot cube of heavily reinforced concrete.
The results of an impact at a speed of about .
1050 feet per second are shown in figure 15.
The eight-ton concrete block is demolished.
The model is flattened to less than 1/2 its
original height. No leaks were detected in
the containment vessel. Had fission products
been inside, they would be safety contained
after the impact. Several such tests have
confirmed that the design principles to be used
will result in a safe design impact survival
(ref. 6).
Another impact test was conducted at Sandia
to determine the effect of impact on soil
(ref. 7). (See fig. 16) The test vehicle is
accelerated by towlines that are pulled by a
rocket sled on a track. An impact on soil at
a speed of 800 feet per second resulted in a
crater about six feet deep, burial of the
model to a depth of 13 feet, and a dented and
slightly scratched model that had no detect-
able leaks. (See fig. 17.)
CONCLUSIONS TO DATE
A study of the feasibility of disposing of
radioactive waste material into space has
resulted in the following conclusions to date:
1. The problems associated with the safe
launch during normal, emergency and accident
situations appear solvable. A conceptual
design of a waste package that incorporates
all the features necessary for achieving the
reliability for such an operation has been
successfully accomplished.
2. The Space Shuttle plus Tug is the most
economical transportation system considered.
3. The cost of disposing of the actinide
portion of the radioactive waste materials
generated by nuclear powerplants would add
about five percent to the cost of the con-
sumer's electric bill.
4. By the end of this century about 100
shuttle launches will be required per year
to dispose of the nuclear wastes generated.
5. Further detailed studies and experimental
verification of key problem areas should be
undertaken.
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